{"id":5839,"date":"2017-12-22T14:12:57","date_gmt":"2017-12-22T14:12:57","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.communitymediaresearch.it\/?p=5505"},"modified":"2026-01-19T18:47:49","modified_gmt":"2026-01-19T17:47:49","slug":"italiani-e-religione-in-crescita-chi-non-si-riconosce-in-nessuna-fede","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.community.it\/en\/2017\/12\/22\/italiani-e-religione-in-crescita-chi-non-si-riconosce-in-nessuna-fede\/","title":{"rendered":"Italians and religion: an increase in those who do not recognise themselves in any faith"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Christmas festive season triggers, first and foremost in media coverage, a well-established pattern: how much will households spend on presents, food and holidays? How will consumer spending fare?<\/p>\n

It is not only because of the difficulties of the past decade that Christmas is regarded as one of the indicators of economic trends. The religious dimension of the festival is not always confined to the intimacy of family life, the private sphere, or the communities of believers. Yet religiosity, just like political ideology, used to constitute a universe of values for people. A set of norms that helped guide individuals\u2019 actions. It enabled the construction of a shared sense of purpose with which to identify and conform. It offered a purpose, a shared goal for the building of society and its future. In other words, religiosity and ideologies were the narratives of the communities that were to be built (and how they were to be built). The use of the past tense is no accident. For these pillars have long since lost their significance. The religious sphere is riven by deep-seated tensions, and this is by no means a recent phenomenon. As early as the beginning of the 1960s, the sociologist Sabino Acquaviva highlighted an \u2018eclipse of the sacred\u2019 in our societies and the waning of the transcendent in people\u2019s daily lives. The shared framework of religious values has gradually been replaced by an individualised interpretation of them, which today we would describe as tailor-made<\/em>, where everyone tailors religious morality to suit themselves in a sort of \u2018do-it-yourself\u2019 manner. So much so that we are faced with a \u2018singular pluralism\u2019 of morality and religion, as defined in a study edited by Garelli, Guizzardi and Pace (Mulino) in 2000.<\/p>\n

Almost 20 years on from that survey, have Italians\u2019 religiosity and spirituality changed any further? Community Media Research has revisited some of the themes relating to Italians\u2019 religious attitudes. Whilst the findings must be treated with the necessary caution given the limited scope of a survey, a comparison with the findings from the start of the century nevertheless highlights how the processes of change observed at that time have deepened. And, in general, Italian society shows clear signs of a gradual erosion of the sacred dimension. Declarations of religious affiliation show that the majority of the Italian population still identify as Catholic today (60.1 per cent). Those belonging to other religious groups \u2013 ranging from Muslims to Buddhists, from Jews to other Christian or non-Christian faiths \u2013 are very much in the minority (a total of 6.5 per cent). By contrast, one in three Italians (33.4 per cent) do not feel they belong to any religious denomination.<\/p>\n

So far, then, Italy would appear to be a country populated by Catholics. If this is the case, however, this proportion has fallen significantly since 2000 \u2013 by as much as 19.1 percentage points \u2013 when it was estimated at 79.2 per cent. This shift, however, rather than benefiting other religious groups, is fuelling the \u2018non-affiliation\u2019 category: 33.4 per cent, compared with 18.8 per cent in 2000. Catholic religious observance therefore still encompasses a large section of Italian society, but is gradually declining. This is not to the benefit of other religious communities, but rather of a sort of limbo. A further reflection of this reduced commitment to religious affiliation can be seen in attendance at religious rites and services. The \u2018regulars\u2019 (those who attend every Sunday or at least several times a month) account for 25.6 per cent, down by as much as 24 percentage points compared with 2000 (when they stood at 49.6 per cent). There has been an increase both in the number of \u2018occasional attendees\u2019 (who attend only on certain occasions or every 4\u20135 months: 47.0 per cent, up from 34.9 per cent in 2000) and the number of those who never attend (27.4 per cent, up from 15.5 per cent in 2000).<\/p>\n

Thus, a decline in the sense of belonging is followed by a lower level of participation in the rituals of religious communities. It is also interesting to note that, even within the various religious groups, these two dimensions (belonging and participation) are not as self-evident as one might think. Among Catholics, only 39.4 per cent attend services regularly, though this figure is higher than that for members of other religious groups (26.2 per cent). Catholics, therefore, appear to be more devout, but it is a (large) minority who participate consistently in community gatherings.<\/p>\n

The erosion of transcendence in people\u2019s everyday lives can be gauged by analysing how many believe they have a spiritual life and believe in a supernatural entity. In both cases, we find that a significant minority identify with both dimensions: 45.4 per cent feel they have a spiritual life, whilst 40.4 per cent are religious. By combining these two statements, we can identify four profiles of spirituality and religiosity. The largest group is that of \u2018materialists\u2019 (46.3 per cent), who state that they have neither a spiritual nor a religious life; they are particularly prevalent amongst those in their 40s (64.5 per cent), far more so than amongst young people (aged up to 24: 44.5 per cent). We find the opposite characteristics among the \u2018believers\u2019 (34.5 per cent), who form the second-largest group and are most common among adults (aged 55 and over: 43.4 per cent). Between these two groups, we find those who have a \u2018subjective spirituality\u2019 (11.1 per cent) but do not recognise any higher power. Conversely, there are those whose religious affiliation is inspired by custom: \u2018cultural religiosity\u2019 (8.1 per cent). It should be emphasised that half of Catholics (51.1 per cent) fall into the \u2018believers\u2019 group, whilst 29.0 per cent are classified as \u2018materialists\u2019.<\/p>\n

The processes of secularisation continue their unchecked advance in our societies. The waning of the sacred dimension gives way to a growing materialism in both individuals and relationships, as Pope Francis himself has repeatedly highlighted. Yet the phenomenon of this eclipse (of the sacred) casts a shadow, as if the dark side were concealing another reality that we struggle to perceive. In this sense, the religious and spiritual pluralism revealed by the survey is also indicative of a search for meaning in the face of the loss of the traditional value system. It is a new quest for meaning in this era of transformation that we are currently experiencing. One that calls for a great deal of discernment.<\/p>\n